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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final order of judgment
entered in the Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge presiding.
PARTIES AND DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The original parties to this action are the aforementioned parties, as well as two named Defendants, to wit:
Klaas and John Doe.

Frank

Jurisdiction over the John Doe was not

obtained and action against Defendant Klaas was dismissed by
stipulation of the remaining parties.
On November 26, 1985, a partial summary judgment motion
and a non-jury trial were heard before the Honorable Scott
Daniels, judge presiding, and a subsequent order on the motion
and findings, conclusions and order were entered on March 26,
1986.

The Plaintiff filed Notice of Appeal on April 23, 1986,

which was amended and re-filed on May 5, 1986.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order of this Court for additur to
the amount of general and punitive damages awarded to Plaintiff.
Alternatively, Plaintiff requests the matter be remanded to the
court below for further findings on the issue of damages only.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of liability.

2.

Whether trial court erred in reducing or denying

Plaintiff's award for general and punitive damages,
3.

Whether Plaintiff is entitled to additur of his

damage award, or alternatively, further findings on the issue of
damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff originally complained for compensatory and
punitive relief from the tortious conduct of Defendant Cau]field.
(R. at 2-7, addendum A.)

Following service of process and

discovery, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the
issue of liability, based in part upon Caulfield's intervening
criminal conviction for the same conduct.

(R. at 125-134.)

The matter came before the court for hearing on the
motion and non-jury trial, which was set before Judge J. Dennis
Frederick, but heard on November 26, 1985 by Judge Scott Daniels.
The court heard the motion, which was denied, and proceeded to
trial on all issues.

(R. at 143-144.)

The court subsequently entered an order which held that
"the court was substantially persuaded by the facts and the law
supporting Plaintiff's motion" but did not grant the motion.

(R.

at 146-147, addendum B.)
During the trial, the Plaintiff again offered documentary evidence of Defendant's criminal conviction to establish
civil liability.

(R. at 145, Exhibit 26-P, addendum D.)

Therein was contained indication of the sentence imposed by the
deciding court, including a $1,000.00 fine.
Following trial the court ordered judgment for the
Plaintiff.

However, in its findings and conclusions the court

reduced Plaintiff's general damage award on the basis that
Plaintiff's emotional distress was mitigated by his years of
experience as a police officer and private detective and that
Plaintiff assumed that risk.
paragraph 17, addendum C.)

(R. at 151, Findings of Fact,

Further, the court found that

Plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages, but awarded $0.00
based solely upon the fact that Defendant had been required to
pay a fine in the criminal case of $1,000.00.

(R. at 152,

Findings of Fact, paragraphs 24, 27-29, addendum C.)

The court's

Conclusions of Law reflected such findings and judgment for
Plaintiff was entered.

(R. at 153-156, addendum C.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in not granting Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of liability.

Further,

the trial court erred in its assessment and allocation of general
and punitive damages based on improper application of the principle of assumption of risk and improper allocation of punitive
damages.

__o

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING TO DENY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY
The application of summary judgment is designed for the
purpose of avoiding unnecessary trials on matters where no
genuine issues of fact exist.
Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (1984).

Reagan Outdoor Advertising v.
In the instant case, the trial

judge ruled that he was "substantially persuaded" by Plaintiff's
motion, but proceeded to trial simply because both parties were
present and ready to proceed.
The Appellant herein contends that such ruling was
inconsistent, and resulted in error which prejudiced subsequent
determination of damages.

Where there are no facts created which

would give rise to a material issue, summary judgment relief is
appropriate.

Anderson v. American Savings and Loan, 668 P.2 1253

(1983); Barnes v. Sohio Natural Resources Company, 627 P.2d 56
(1981) .
The prejudicial error which resulted from the inconsistent ruling of the trial judge can be related to the relitigation
of the issue.

During the trial, Plaintiff submitted documenta-

tion of Defendant Caulfield's criminal conviction for the purpose
of establishing liability.

(Addendum D.)

Contained in the

document was a recitation of the sentence imposed, including a
fine of $1,000.00.

Had summary judgment been properly granted,

such evidence would not have been submitted or subsequently
considered by the court in determining punitive damages.

Based on the court's own ruling, the failure to grant
summary judgment was error and as such should be remanded to the
trial court for an order consistent with its findings.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS
ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

The trial court found for Plaintiff and awarded both
general and punitive damages.

However, the general damages were

erroneously mitigated by Plaintiff's "assumption of risk".
Likewise, the punitive damage award was wrongly nullified by the
court's gratuitous recognition of the $1,000.00 fine paid in a
related criminal case.
A.

General Damages

The doctrine of assumption of risk is commonly seen in
three general areas of tort law:
strict liability.

negligence, master-servant, and

See generally, 7 C.J.S. Assumption of Risk;

65A C.J.S. §174 Negligence.

Somewhat mystically, the doctrine

arose in the instant matter in the court's finding (paragraph 17)
that Plaintiff's prior and present profession inferred a reasonable expectation of endangerment which Plaintiff was found to
have assumed.
Whether a person can reasonably expect to be shot at
while picking up abandoned garbage sacks may be a factual issue
left to the determination of the trial court.

However, there is

two bases for Appellant's contention that the trial court erred
in its application.

S-

Initially, the torts of assault and infliction of
emotional distress as pled in the instant case are intentional
torts.

It is Appellant's position that one cannot assume the

risk of an intentional tort.
Secondly, Plaintiff's job as a private investigator is
not so inherently dangerous as to give rise to reasonable expectation of extreme violence.

To that end, it is argued that in

order for defense of assumption of risk to be established, it
should be found that Plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably
encountered a known risk.
The analysis of a sister jurisdiction is borrowed in
support of this contention.

In Johnson v. Clark Equipment

Company, 547 P.2d 132 (Oregon, 1976), a product liability action
was brought against manufacturers and sellers of a forklift.

The

court therein analyzed the aspects of assumption of risk from a
product liability standpoint.

It further noted some consid-

erations salient to the reasonableness of encountering
job-related danger.
Reviewing caselaw of other jurisdictions, the Johnson
court observed:
"It could never be said as a matter of law
that a workman whose job requires him to
expose himself to danger voluntarily and
unreasonably encounters the same." [Citation
omitted.]
The court went on to note:

"Plaintiff must be declared free of contributory negligence as a matter of law because
the risk of harm itself was not so imminent,
nor was the likelihood of injury so great
that, in view of the interest plaintiff
sought to advance, no prudent man would
face it". [Citation omitted.]
547 P.2d at 141.
In the instant matter, the court made no finding that
the risk was known, nor did it indicate the subjecting to such
risk was done voluntarily or unreasonably.

The court only stated

that Plaintiff should reasonably expect to be so endangered in
his employment, and reduced the general damage as a result.
It is herein asserted that the doctrine of assumption
of risk was inappropriately applied and this matter should be
remanded to the trial court for assessment of general damages
consistent with its findings.
B.

Punitive Damages

The most curious part of the decision in the instant
matter was the court's ruling on punitive damages.

The court

made the necessary findings for an award of punitive damages, and
then awarded Plaintiff $0.00.

In so doing, the court considered

evidence improperly before the court and resultantly ruled in a
manner which is at variance with the claims of both parties.

See

Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (1984);
West v. West, 16 Utah 2d 411, 403 P.2d 22 (1965).
Utah has traditionally permitted recovery of punitive
damages in personal injury cases, including assault.

Cruz v.

Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (1983).

However, such award must be

intended as a deterrent and preventative measure to prospectively
restrain the malefactor, and should be granted infrequently.
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (1983).
Again, the Appellant would assert two bases for remanding this matter back to the trial court on the issue of punitive
damages.

First, the award of $0.00 damage is contrary to the

court's finding and results in an inconsistent judgment.

While

granting Plaintiff relief, the absence of an award results in a
ruling in favor of Defendant.
Secondly/ the court indicated it considered the
$1,000.00 fine a sufficient punishment of Defendant.

This was

discerned from evidence before the court submitted to establish
liability.

While this Court grants broad discretion to the trial

court in determining damages, the award may be set aside if the
trial court neglected certain pertinent elements or was unduly
influenced by extraneous circumstances.

Mabey v. Kay Peterson

Construction Co., 682 P.2d 287 (1984); Clayton v. Crossroads
Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (1982).
The court, bv its ruling, improperly considered the
extraneous circumstance of Defendant's sentence in the criminal
matter.

This was particularly true where the general damage

award had already been reduced.

Therefore, the matter should be

remanded to the trial court for award consistent with the findings of the court.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the general and punitive
damage awards totalling $500.00 should be ruled inadequate and
the matter remanded to the trial court for further findings on
the issue of damages.
DATED this

IQ

day of December, 19|86.

LONI F. qeLAND
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

SCOTT W. TjfEEI
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

X

day of December,

1986, four true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed,
with postage prepaid fully thereon, to David K. Smith, Attorney
for Defendant/Respondent, 6925 Union Park Center^ #30$, Midvale,
Utah 84047.
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AND FOR SALT
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LAKE

DISTRICT

COUNTY,

STfrKE

COURT
OF

UTAH

DAVID WESTLEY,
Plaintiff,
-vCivil Number::

EDWARD CAULFIELD, FRANK
KLAAS, and JOHN DOE,
Defendants.

C84585S

Plaintiff alleges, and complains, for causes of action, as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

2.

Defendants Caufield and Klaas are residents of Salt Lake County,

State of Utah.
3.

The identity and residence of Defendant Doe is unknown to Plain-

4.

On or about the 19th day of April, 1984, in Salt Lake County,

tiff.

State of Utah, Defendant Caulfield intentionally fired a .38 caliber
revolver at Plaintiff, as Plaintiff was seated in his automobile.
5.

Said firing of said revolver was without justification.

6.

Said firing of said revolver was in violation of certain penal

statutes of the State of Utah, designed to protect a class of which
Plaintiff is a member.
7.

The projectile discharged, as complained of above, struck

Plaintiff's motor vehirlp. ranc^o ^ m a . n -i

-~

, « * :. «i-.1 *a-«

8.

Said damage to Plaintiff's motor vehicle was intentionally

caused by Defendant Caulfield.
SECOND
9.

CAUSE

OF

ACTION

Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs

1-8 aboves and reincorporates them herein by reference.
10. The circumstances of Defendant Caulfieldfs firing of the revolver as complained of above were such as to create in the mind of
Plaintiff a well-founded fear of imminent battery.
11.

The acts of Defendant Caufield complained of above were such

that Defendant Caufield had the apparent ability to effectuate a battery
on Plaintiff.
12.

The acts of Defendant Caulfield as complained of above were

intended by him to put Plaintiff in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery, or were done with knowledge to a substantial certainty that
Plaintiff would be put in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery,
or were done with knowledge to a substantial certainty that Plaintiff
would be put in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.
13.

The acts of Defendant as complained of above caused Plain-

tiff great mental distress, pain and anguish, and damages.
THIRD
14.

CAUSE

OF ACTION

Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs

1-13, above, and reincorporates them herein by reference.
15.

The projectile discharged by Defendant Caulfield, as des-

cribed above, were done with the intent and desire to cause Plaintiff
great emotional distress, or with knowledge to a substantial certainty
that great emotional distress to Plaintiff would result.

16.

The acts of Defendant Caulfield, as complained of above, were

done with the intent and desire to cause Plaintiff great emotional distress,
or with knowledge to a substantial certainty that great emotional distress
to Plaintiff would result.
17.

Said acts of Defendant caused Plaintiff great mental distress,

pain and anguish, and damages.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
18.

Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs

1 — 17^ and reincorporates them herein by reference.
19.

The revolver which Defendant Caulfield committed the acts

complained of above was provided to Defendant Caulfield by Defendant
John Doe.
20.

Defendant John Doe was under a duty to exercise reasonable

care in providing a revolver to another individual.
21.

Defendant John Doe breached said duty of reasonable care in

providing Defendant Caulfield a revolver as complained of above.
22. The acts of Defendant John Doe as complained of above were
without any utility, and were with substantial risks to members of the
public.
23.

Defendant John Doe's conduct, as complained of above, consti-

tuted an unreasonable risk of harm to others , including members of the
general public, and Plaintiff.
24.

As a proximate result of Defendant John Doe's breach of his

duty of reasonable care, Plaintiff has suffered damages.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
25.

Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs

1-24, above, and reincorporates then herein by reference.
26.

The confrontation of Defendant Caulfield with Plaintiff, as

complained of above, was done at the request, and with the assent, agreement, approval and knowledge and for the benefit, and at the suggestion
of Defendant Klaas.
27.

Minutes before Defendant Caulfield fired the revolver, as com-

plained of above, he and Defendant Klaas planned to confront Plaintiff.
28.

The planned confrontation occurred, and at said confrontation

the acts of Defendant Caulfield, as complained of above, occurred.
29.

During Defendants' Caulfield and Klaas1 planning,, as com-

plained of above, Defendant Caulfield produced the revolver complained
of above, and loaded the same, in preparation for the above-stated confrontation with Plaintiff, all in the presence of Defendant Klaas.
30. During said planning, Defendant Klaas took no steps to dissuade
or deter Defendant Caulfield from loading, carrying, or using said revolver as complained above.
31.

Defendant Caulfield was acting as Defendant Klaas1 agent

in doing the acts complained of above.
32.

Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of the acts, comp-

lained of above, done by Defendant Klaas* agent.
SIXTH
33.

CAUSE

OF

ACTION

Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs

1-32, above, and reincorporates them herein by reference.
34.

Defendant Klaas, by his actions and words, set into motion

the acts of Defendant Caulfield complained of above, and the consequences of those acts, as complained of above.
35.

Defendant Klaas owed a duty to the members of the general

public, including Plaintiff, to exercise reasonable care in taking
the steps which he did, as complained of above.
36.

The acts and activity of Defendant Klaas, as complained of

above, were without any utility, and were with, and constituted, a
substantial risk to members of the general public.
37.

The acts and activity of Defendant Klaas, as complained of

above, constitiuted an unreasonable risk of harm to the members of the
general public, including Plaintiff.
38.

Defendant Klaas breached the duty of reasonable care owed

to the general public,including Plaintiff, as alleged above.
39.

Defendant Klaas1 breach of said duty proximately caused Plain-

tiff damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgement as follows:
1.

On the FIRST and FIFTH CAUSES OF ACTION, $6,000 in compensatory

damages, and punitive damages in the sum of $50,000.
2.

On the SECOND, THIRD, and FIFTH CAUSES OF ACTION, compensatory

damages in a sum to be determined and proved at trial, but not less than
$50,000, and punitive damages in the sum of $50,000.
3.

On the FOURTH and SIXTH CAUSES OF ACTION, compensatory damages

in a sum to be determined and proved at the time of trial, but not less
than the sum of $56,000.

-5-

DATED THIS

3.

day of October,

1984.

Jybhn W. Ebert
ttorney for Plaintiff

Plaintiff's address:
1288 Sunset Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah

FILMED
LONI F. DeLAND (0862)
McRae & DeLand
Attorneys for Plaintiff
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-1333
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID WESTLEY,
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
EDWARD CAULFIELD, FRANK KLAAS,
and JOHN DOE,

Civil No. C-84-5856
Judge Daniels

Defendants.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to defendant
Caulfield's liability only on plaintiff's Complaint came before
the Honorable Scott Daniels at 9:00 a.m. on November 26, 1985.
Plaintiff
DeLand.

was present

and represented

by Loni F.

Defendant Caulfield was present and represented by David

K. Smith.
The court reviewed the Memorandum of plaintiff and
heard the argument of both counsel, defendant Caulfield having
filed no responsive memorandum thereto.
After hearing the proffer and argument of counsel and
reviewing plaintiff's Memorandum

and the pleadings and file

herein, even though the court was substantially persuaded by the
facts and

the law supporting

plaintiff's motion, the court

_ v *< is *

observed that both parties were present and ready to proceed to
trial and does therefor;
HEREBY ORDER, ADJUDGE

AND

DECREE

that

plaintiff's

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be and is denied.

DATED this <PS, day of kklL^L

, 1986.

BY THE COURT:

SCOTT DANIELS
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

IkTTS^T
D»AON m.«iiA2T

»y

DAVID K. SMITH
Attorney for Defendant

LONI F. DeLAND
Attorney for Plaintiff

EN^.*/C*f*
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LONI F. DeLAND (0862)
McRae & DeLand
Attorneys for Plaintiff
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-1333
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID WESTLEY,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND
DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM

vs.
EDWARD CAULFIELD, FRANK KLAAS,
and JOHN DOE,

Civil No. C-84-5856
Judge Daniels

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the
Honorable Scott Daniels, sitting without a jury, at 9:00 a.m.,
November 26, 1985, on Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant
Edward Caulfield and said Defendant's Counterclaim, the remaining
Defendants having been previously dismissed as parties hereto.
Plaintiff was present and represented by Loni F.
DeLand.

Defendant Caulfield was present and represented by David

K. Smith.
Each party testified and called witnesses on their
behalf.

The Court heard the testimony of the parties and the

witnesses and received the exhibits offered by each party.

Nowf having heard the evidence and testimony, reviewed
the exhibits, pleadings, and file herein, the Court enters the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about 8:20 a.m., April 19, 1984, plaintiff,

acting in the scope of his employment as a duly licensed private
investigator, was engaged in collecting the garbage of Frank
Klaas which had been deposited on the curb in front of Klaas1
residence in Salt Lake County, Utah.
2.

At said time, date and location, defendant Edward

Caulfield intentionally fired a .38 caliber revolver at plaintiff's vehicle as plaintiff was attempting to drive away from the
scene.
3.

The projectile struck the molding of the rear

window of plaintiff's vehicle shattering the said window and
causing damage to the body and paint on the rear of the vehicle.
4.

The reasonable and necessary cost of repairs to

said vehicle were $105.75 to replace the window and $350. for
painting and body repairs.
5.

The said damages and required

repairs were

proximately caused by defendant.
6.

Plaintiff was without the use of said vehicle for

approximately four days while repairs were done.
7.

The reasonable value of the loss of use of said

vehicle is $100.

8.

The defendant should be liable to plaintiff in the

sum of $555,75, special damages, to compensate plaintiff for the
cost of repairs to and loss of use of said vehicle.
9.

In fleeing the scene of the shooting, plaintiff's

vehicle did not touch defendant Caulfield.
10.

Plaintiff did not assault or intend to assault

defendant with said vehicle.
11.

Plaintiff's acceleration and flight from the scene

was a reasonable response to the actions of defendant Caulfield.
12.

There being no assault by plaintiff as claimed by

defendant Caulfield, said defendant's Counterclaim should be
dismissed for no cause of action.
13.

Plaintiff reasonably believed that the projectile

fired by defendant at plaintiff's vehicle could have easily
struck him in the back of his head thereby causing death or
serious bodily injury.
14.

Due to the defendant's use of the firearm and the

testimony of plaintiff's expert witness, Ed Barton, plaintiff's
subjective belief as alleged above is a reasonable one.
15.

As a natural consequence of the actions of defen-

dant Caulfield and plaintiff's reasonable belief, plaintiff
suffered emotional distress infrequently for a period of a few
months following the shooting.

. $ \**

16.

Defendant Caulfield knew or should have known that

firing his weapon at plaintiff's vehicle while plaintiff was
inside it would inflict emotional distress upon plaintiff.
17.

However, plaintiff has many years of experience as

a police officer and a private investigator including prior
shooting incidents which should mitigate the distress suffered by
plaintiff since he has, by virtue of his chosen profession(s),
assumed the risk of being shot at and should reasonable expect to
be so endangered in his employment.
18.

Defendant Caulfield should be ordered to pay

plaintiff the sum of $500. general damages to compensate him for
the emotional distress inflicted by said defendant on plaintiff
as a natural consequence of defendant's conduct.
19.

Plaintiff was not licensed, on April 19, 1984, by

Salt Lake County or Sandy City, as a person authorized under
those respective ordinances to engage in garbage collection.
20.

Defendant Caulfield's conduct in firing a deadly

weapon at plaintiff's vehicle while plaintiff was driving the
said vehicle is an aggravated assault regardless of whether or
not defendant's intent was to "only" mark the vehicle.
21.

Defendant Caulfield's conduct as described above

was willful and malicious.
22.

Defendant Caulfield's actions are not mitigated,

excused or justified by the facts, the law or any defense raised
by defendant herein.

23.

Defendant Caulfield's actions were extremely

reckless and ran the risk of causing plaintiff death or serious
bodily injury.
24.

Defendant Caulfield's actions should be punished

and said punishment should be substantial enough to deter him
from similar conduct in the future.
25.

Defendant Caulfield owns an equity in his home of

$7,200 to $9,200, vehicles worth $7,000, stocks valued at $700
and bank accounts totaling $5,000.
26.

Defendant Caulfield is presently unemployed and

unable to be employed in his chosen profession as a commercial
helicopter pilot due to his inability to obtain FAA licensing for
medical reasons, however, he is able bodied and capable of other
employment but chooses not to seek or accept other employment.
27 •

However, defendant Caulfield

was prosecuted

criminally for these same actions and pleaded guilty to a reduced
charge for which he was placed on probation and fined $1,000.00,
the fine having been paid by him and the term of probation having
been successfully completed without violation.
28.

The $1,000 fine exacted by the criminal court is

sufficient to punish defendant and deter him from future similar
conduct.
29.

Punitive damages in the instant lawsuit should be

awarded plaintiff in the sum of $0.

30.

Defendant Caulfield's responses to plaintiff's

Request for Admissions, dated December 14, 1985, were apposite
his deposition testimony, court testimony herein and his plea of
guilty in the related criminal case, which responses required
unnecessary time and effort by plaintiff's counsel in preparing
for trial,
31.

Plaintiff, therefor, should be awarded $250

attorney's fees.
32.

Plaintiff should be awarded all costs incurred

herein which are taxable and were reasonable and necessary in
prosecuting his Complaint and defending defendant's Counterclaim.
33.

Plaintiff should be awarded pre-judgment interest

on his special, general and punitive damages from and after April
19, 1984, and until entry of the judgment herein.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now makes
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff's allegations of aggravated assault,

battery and infliction of emotional distress are proved against
defendant Caulfield by a preponderance of the evidence.
2.

Defendant Caulfield did not preponderate on any

claim in his Counterclaim.
3.

Defendant

Caulfield's Counterclaim

dismissed for no cause of action.

should be

4.

Defendant Caulfield's defenses to plaintiff's

Complaint are without factual or legal merit.
5.

Defendant Caulfield's unjustified, inexcusable and

unreasonable use of a deadly weapon created a serious risk of
death or bodily injury to plaintiff.
6.

The said actions of defendant Caulfield were

intentional, willful and malicious.
7.

Defendant Caulfield's actions proximately caused

plaintiff to incur special damages in the sum of $555.75, for
repairs to and loss of use of his vehicle, for which said defendant should be liable to plaintiff.
8.

Plaintiff suffered emotional distress as a natural

consequence of defendant Caulfield's actionable conduct for which
plaintiff should be awarded $500 general damages against said
defendant.
9.

Defendant Caulfield's aggravated tortious conduct

should be punished and he should be prospectively deterred from
such conduct by an award of punitive damages to plaintiff.
10.

The

$1,000 fine exacted

against

defendant

Caulfield in the related criminal case is sufficient and just
punishment for his conduct.
11.

Punitive damages should be awarded to plaintiff,

and against defendant Caulfield in the sum of $0.
12.

Attorney's fees of $250 should be awarded plain-

tiff, and against defendant Caulfield, due to said defendant's

failure to provide genuine and accurate answers to plaintiff's
Request for Admissions on file herein under date of December 14,
1985.
13.

Defendant Caulfield should be ordered to pay

plaintiff his reasonable and necessary costs incurred in prosecuting plaintiff's Complaint and defending defendant's Counterclaim.
14.

Defendant Caulfield should be ordered to pay

plaintiff interest at the statutory pre-judgment rate retrospective to April 19, 1984.
15.

Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment against

defendant Caulfield in the sum of $1,555.75 for special, general
and punitive damages; interest thereon at the statutory rate
retrospective to April 19, 1984; attorney's fees in the sum of
$250 and reasonable costs.
16.

Interest from April 19, 1984 on $1,555.75, to and

including December 19, 1985 equals $155.59.
JUDGMENT
1.

Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against defendant

Caulfield in the sum of $1,961.34, on plaintiff's Complaint,
Counts I, II and III.
2.

The said judgment includes special, general and

punitive damages, prejudgment interest thereon to December 19,
1985, attorney's fees and taxable costs.

. • * '

.*•*?$>>

3.

Defendant

Caulfield's Counterclaim

herein is

dismissed.
DATED this

J.^

day of

\LJAMA,

, 1986.

BY THE COURT:

SCOTT DANIELS
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

) 7*
DAVID K. SMITH
Attorney for Defendant

LONI F. DeLAND
Attorney for Plaintiff

\?

Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department.
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